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INTRODUCTION	 1
Weld joints thicker than 0.500 in. are normally welded from both sides
to minimize distortion and expensive joint preparation. On previous space flight
vehicles, square butt joints as thick as 1.000 in. were welded using the double
sided welding technique. When double sided welding is used, lack of nugget
tie-in (Fig. 1) can result in a very tight lack-of-penetration type defect. Earlier
work at AISFC showed that such defects are not reliably detected by ultrasonics
or radiographic nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques. When the double-
sided technique was used, weld parameters were established on destructively
tested samples representative of the joint thickness, alloy, and heat sink to
assure that the weld nuggets overlapped a minimum of 0. 125 in.
Because of the varying heat sinks encountered on some of the SRB skirt
weld joints, the possibility of having an unfused weld joint increased. Previous
vehicles were proof tested before use to assure that undetected defects did not
cause structural problems in flight. However, because of the expense involved,
the skirts are not being proof tested. The possibility of a flaw not being detected
necessitated the development of a welding process that is completely inspectable.
Five weld joints on the SRB skirts, ranging in thickness from 0.5 to 1.375
in., had been originally designed for double sided welding of the type used on pre-
vious programs. However, the identification of these joints as fracture critical
precluded this approach. The fracture critical designation required that the
joint design be modified to provide reliable inspection and structural tolerances
demanded that the process be optimized to minimize distortion. A summary of
these five joints is given in Table 1. Figures 2 and 3 show the location of the
welds on the forward and aft skirts.
APPROACH	 I
Previous experience with welding 2219 aluminum at 11ISFC dictated many
of the decisions concerning preweld cleaning, the welding process, shielding
gases, welding position, etc. The direct-current, straight polarity, Gas
Tungsten Arc Process was chosen because of its penetration capabilities.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF FIVE JOINTS
Weld No.
Joint Thickness
(in.) Parts To Be Joined
1 1.250 Forward skirt slain to thrust post
2 0.500 in. Forward skirt skin to skin
3 0.500 to 1.250 Forward shirt to attach ring
4 1.375 in. Aft shirt conical shins to hold
down posts
5 1.375 Aft skirt to forward ring on 13 deg
angle
Vertical up was chosen as the welding position to mi ►umize internal defects and
to better control the molten puddle on a through penetration type weld. Preweld
cleaning included removal of all oil, dirts, and foreign matter with chemicals,
then just prior to welding, filing or scraping the abutting edges of the joint.
Helium was selected over argon as the sluelciing gas because of its deeper
penetrating characteristics.
Two approaches to weld ,joint design were taken to improve inspectability.
The first approach involved using a "witness" type groove machined into the weld
joint which would appear as a void during radiographic inspection if the weld
joint was not completely fused. The second approach involved design of a Held
joint that could meet the following criteria: (1) visual inspection to assure
complete penetration of the joint, (2) balance of shrinkage forces to minimize
distortion, (3) ease of welding, and (4) machining of the joint to be as si ►nple
as possible (i.e. , no step type joints if possible) .
DI SCUSSION
Several joint configurations containing "witness grooves" were desigr ►ed
(Fig. -1). The incorporation of this groove required an extra machining opera-
tion, thus increasing; joint preparation costs. In addition, the configurations
containing witness grooves proved significantly h;u-dcr to clean prior to welding.
When joints containing witness grooves were \%clded, a significant increase in
2
porosity was noted over that normally encountered without a groove. This
increase in porosity was attributed to contamination which could not be easily
removed from the groove.
When intentional lack-of-penetration was induced in welds with witness
grooves, detection of this condition by radiographic inspection was inconsistent.
Investigation revealed that the following two factors contributed to inconsistent
detection: (1) filling of the witness groove with metal and (2) coining of the
groove surfaces by weld shrinkage forces.
In the first instance, weld metal would flow into the witness groove with
insufficient heat to fuse to the groove walls. In the second instance, the elevated
temperature due to welding and the shrinkage forces in the weld caused the side
wall of the groove to be forced together with sufficient force to coin the surfaces.
This defect is too tight to be detected; therefore, work on witness grooves uas
abandoned in favor of a simpler solution.
The second approach investigated involved redesigning the joint configura-
tion to eliminate the possibility of hidden lack-of-penetration defects during
welding. In determining joint configurations, four objectives were to be met:
1. Visual verification of root penetration
2. Minimum numb-r of fill pass
3. Easy-to-machine configuration
4. Adequate accessibility for the welding torch.
Five joint designs were evolved which met these requirements.
Land thicknesses were determined by finding the nixximunl thickness that
could be easily penetrated and controlled. This land thickness is dependent upon
factors such as heat sink and weld position. Land thickness varied from 0.250
in. thickness for the 0.500 in. thick joint to 0. 375 in. tluelmess on Lhe 1.250 in.
thick material. Joint details are shown in Figure 5. Filler wire is not added
on the penetration pass; this allows better control of the penetration bead due to
a smaller volume of molten metal. During the penetration pass, the undurbead
can be visually observed. Adjustments in machine settings can he mare N%hc.n
necessary to correct for varying heat sink conditions. The resultant penetration
bead is smooth enough for the filler passes to be made directly on it withl10t an .N•
mechanical preparation. After the root pass is made, visual inspection is
adequate to assure that no lack of penetration occurred.
3
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Except for weld No. 3, all of the joints have straight sidewalls. This
straight sidewall design decreases the number of fill passes required. «eld
No. 3 was designed with a 2.5 deg side angle because of the depth of the groove.
Due to the depth of the groove, operator visibility was limited with straight
sidewalls.
Figures 6 and 7 are micrographs of the 1.250 and 1.375 in. weld cross
section. The narrow "U" type groove allows the filler passes to tie-in to the
preceding weld pass and both sidewalls without transverse movement of tite weld
torch. This results in a narrow weld nugget as compared to a "t"' type joint
preparation.
Table 2 gives a summary of the average mechanical strength properties
obtained from the five weld joints. The 2219 aluminum for the shirts is Helded
in the T37 heat treat condition, then artificially aged to the T87 condition.
Artificial aging after welding increases the ultimate strength by 10 to 2, 7, percent
anal the yield strength by 23 to 45 percent as compared to the as-welded T s7.
TABLE 2. MECHANICAL 13ROPEIITIF,S
Weld No. Joint Thickness (in.) TUS (ksi) TYS (ksi)
Elongation
in	 2	 iii.	 g:'FL'*I
1 1.250 plate to forging 46.2 36.6 2. 7
2 0.500 plate to plate 414.9 33.7 5.4
3 1.250 forging to forging 46. 1 32.8 3.9
1.250 plate to forging 46.2 3G.6 2.7
4 1.375 plate to forging 48.6 35.8 4.0
5 1.375 plate to forking 49.6 35.8 4.0
1.375 forging to forging .1 C. G :35.9 3.1
Nu'Le.
1. All welds were subjected to a post weld ;aging cycle of 350° F foi-
ls h.
2. TUS/T.S/E1 are average values from 15 to 2 .1 tensile observations.
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CONCLUSIONS
The use of witness grooves in thick aluminum welds does not improve the
detectability of lack of nugget tie-in in double-sided welds. The incorporation of
these grooves increases joint preparation cost and increases the probabilAy of
getting porosity due to the difficulty involved in cleaning the grooved area. For
this reason, this approach cannot be recommended.
The use of a joint configuration where root penetration is accomplished
in a single pass provides adequate assurance, by visual inspection, that lack of
penetration did not occur. This approach, combined with double-sided welding,
provides for pass sequencing to balance shrinkage forces and eliminates distor-
tion. The same benefits cannot be gained by welding from one side.
The implementation of the revised weld joint designs and well pass
sequencing developed during this study on the SRB satisfied the inspectnbilit.
requirements for fracture control. The reduced distortion ix.ssible with this
improved process easily satisfies design requirements.
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Figure 5. Joint detail and pass sequence;.
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